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David Reiss
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
Creatures of Regulatory Privilege1
As part of its response to the ongoing credit crisis, the federal government placed
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-chartered, privately owned mortgage
finance companies, in conservatorship. These two massive companies are profit-driven,
but as government-sponsored enterprises (―GSEs‖) they also have a governmentmandated mission to provide liquidity and stability to the United States mortgage market
and to achieve certain affordable housing goals. How the two companies should exit
their conservatorship is of key importance to the future of federal housing finance policy.
Indeed, this question is of pressing importance as the Obama Administration has signaled
that it would rely heavily on Fannie and Freddie as part of the short term response to the
foreclosure epidemic that has swept across America in the last couple of years. Once the
acute crisis is dealt with, however, the Administration will need to put American housing
finance policy on the right track for the long-term health of the system. This will require
a framework for analyzing the needs of that system, a framework which this chapter
provides.
Fannie and Freddie are extraordinarily large companies: together, they own or
guarantee more than forty percent of all the residential mortgages in the United States.
This amounts to over 5.4 trillion dollars in mortgages. By statute, Fannie and Freddie‘s
operations are limited to the ―conforming‖ portion of the mortgage market, which is
made up of mortgages that do not exceed an annually adjusted threshold ($417,000 in
2009 and significantly higher in high-cost areas). The two companies effectively have no
competition in the conforming sector of the mortgage market because of advantages
granted to them by the federal government in their charters. The most significant of these
advantages has been the federal government‘s implied guarantee of Fannie and Freddie‘s
debt obligations. The implied guarantee allowed Fannie and Freddie to borrow funds
1

This chapter is based in large part on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing
Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. xxx(forthcoming 2010).
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more cheaply than its fully-private competitors and thereby offer the most attractive
pricing in the conforming market. As the two companies have grew and grew, numerous
commentators and government officials called for their reform. Fannie and Freddie‘s
powerful lobbying forces, however, have kept these reformers mostly at bay until they
entered conservatorship.
As a result, Fannie and Freddie continued to grow at a rapid rate through the early
2000s, until they were each hit by accounting scandals. In response to those scandals,
Congress and the two companies‘ regulators began to take various steps to limit their
growth. But once they stabilized in 2007, the current credit crisis commenced and their
market share began to increase once again as other lenders could not raise capital to lend
to borrowers. At first, many commentators believed that Fannie and Freddie would ride
the crisis relatively unscathed, but it turned out that they had much more exposure to the
problems in the toxic subprime and Alt-A portions of the mortgage market than they had
let on in their public disclosures.
Because of their poor underwriting, the two companies started posting quarterly
losses in 2007 that ran into the billions of dollars, with larger losses on the horizon. As a
result, they were having trouble complying with the capital requirements set by their
regulator. Their problems began to spiral out of the control along with those of the rest of
the financial sector until then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson. Jr. asked that
Congress give the Treasury the authority to take over the two companies if they were not
able to meet their financial obligations. Congress, with remarkable alacrity, passed the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (the ―Act‖) in the summer of 2008. Soon
thereafter Paulson decided that the two companies were flirting with insolvency and
placed them in conservatorship, pursuant to the Act.
While the American taxpayer will likely be required to fund a bailout of the two
companies that will be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars, the current state of
affairs presents an opportunity to reform the two companies and the manner in which the
mortgage market is structured. Though the need for reform is evident, few scholars have
considered the issue systematically. Scholars have, however, built up a significant base
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of knowledge about what works well and what does not work well with public/private
hybrids like Fannie and Freddie.
Contemporary theories of regulation persuasively argue that special interests work
to bend the tools of government to benefit themselves. This chapter, relying on
regulatory theory, provides a framework with which to conceptualize the possibilities for
reform by viewing Fannie and Freddie as creatures of regulatory privilege. A critical
insight of regulatory theory is that regulatory privilege should be presumed to be
inconsistent with a competitive market, unless proven otherwise. The federal
government‘s special treatment of Fannie and Freddie is an extraordinary regulatory
privilege in terms of its absolute value, its impact on its competitors and its cost to the
federal government. As such, regulatory theory offers a fruitful resource for academics
and policymakers considering reform of Fannie and Freddie‘s privileged status because it
clarifies how Fannie and Freddie have relied upon their hybrid public/private structure to
obtain and protect economic rents at the expense of homeowners as well as Fannie and
Freddie‘s competitors.
Once analyzed in the context of regulatory theory, Fannie and Freddie‘s future
seems clear. They should be privatized so that they can compete on an even playing field
with other financial institutions and their public functions should be assumed by
government actors. While this is a radical solution and one that would have been
considered politically naïve until the current credit crisis, it is now a serious option that
should garner additional attention once its rationale is set forth.
In an earlier study, I provided a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory
privilege that Fannie and Freddie enjoy.2 This chapter builds on that work to situate that
privilege within a broader understanding of regulatory theory and to explain the rare
hybrid public/private nature of the privilege that Fannie and Freddie enjoy. In doing so,
this chapter argues that the existing regulation of the two companies should be brought in
line with our current understanding of how government should be deploying its power in
the private sector.
2

Reiss. (2008).
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Part I will describe Fannie and Freddie‘s role in
the secondary market for residential mortgages. After describing what happened to the
two companies in the credit crisis that commenced in 2007, it will outline the key
provisions of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which authorized the
federal government to place the Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship.
Part II then shifts to construct a theoretical framework with which to evaluate
Fannie and Freddie. Part II.A presents Fannie and Freddie‘s assessment of their own
roles in the secondary residential mortgage market. Part II.B reviews how other scholars
have conceptualized the role of Fannie and Freddie in the housing finance market.

Part

II.C then evaluates the operation of Fannie and Freddie in the context of six policy goals
that derive from contemporary regulatory theory: (i) maintaining competition; (ii)
efficiently allocating society‘s goods and services; (iii) promoting innovation; (iv)
preventing inappropriate wealth transfers; (v) preserving consumer choice; and (vi)
preventing an overly-concentrated economy. It finds that Fannie and Freddie come up
short under nearly all of those goals.
Based on the conclusion of Part II that Fannie and Freddie no longer have a net
positive impact, Part III argues that the two companies should be privatized. It also
argues that the benefits that Fannie and Freddie produce in the residential mortgage
market should be maintained through alternative means, including financial regulation,
consumer protection legislation and increased subsidies for affordable housing.
I.

Fannie and Freddie and the Credit Crisis
This Part begins by explaining what Fannie and Freddie do in the mortgage

markets. It then describes how they fared in the credit crisis that commenced in 2007.
This brief history opens with the early phase of the credit crisis in which the two
companies were perceived as potential white knights, mounting a defense of the
distressed secondary mortgage market. It then details their own troubles that led to the
enactment of the Housing and Recovery Act of 2008. It concludes with the government
placing them in conservatorship as the financial condition of the two companies rapidly
disintegrated.
4
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A. Fannie and Freddie‘s Business
Fannie and Freddie have two primary lines of business. First, they provide credit
guarantees so that groups of residential mortgages can be packaged as residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Second, Fannie and Freddie purchase residential
mortgages and related securities with borrowed funds. Because of the federal
government‘s implied guarantee of their debt securities, Fannie and Freddie have been
able to profit greatly from this second line of business. This is because they can make
money on the spread between their low cost of funds and what they must pay for the
mortgage-related investments in their portfolios.
Fannie and Freddie‘s charters restrict the mortgages they may buy. In general,
they may only buy mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of eighty percent or less unless
the mortgage carries mortgage insurance or other credit support and may not buy
mortgages with principal amounts greater than an amount set each year. Loans that
Fannie and Freddie can buy are known as ―conforming‖ loans. Loans that exceed the
loan amount limit in a given year are known as ―jumbo‖ loans. Most of the remainder of
the RMBS market belongs to ―private label‖ firms which securitize (i) jumbo mortgages
and (ii) subprime mortgages that Fannie and Freddie cannot or choose not to guarantee or
purchase for their own portfolio.
Because Fannie and Freddie have so dominated the conforming sector of the
mortgage market, they have standardized that sector by promulgating buying guidelines
that lenders must follow if they want to sell their mortgages to either of the two
companies. Such standardization has led to increases in the liquidity and attractiveness of
mortgages as investments to a broad array of investors.
The government guarantee of Fannie and Freddie‘s debt obligations is a
regulatory privilege that arose from Congress‘ efforts to create a national secondary
residential mortgage market in the 1960s and 1970s. It is the characteristic that allows
them to borrow more cheaply than other financial institutions. It is the characteristic that
allows them to completely dominate the prime conforming mortgage market. And it is the
characteristic that poses the greatest threat to the federal government and the American
5
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taxpayer. One must therefore properly account for it in order to understand Fannie and
Freddie.
Unlike true monopolists, Fannie and Freddie‘s market power is limited by the
nature of their competitive advantage: in an otherwise efficient market, the maximum
amount that they can retain as economic rent is the spread between the interest rates they
must pay and those that their competitors must pay. Nonetheless, Fannie and Freddie
share a key characteristic in common with government-granted monopolies: a legallycreated and overwhelming competitive advantage in a particular market, which translates
into higher prices for consumers than would exist if Fannie and Freddie did not retain a
portion of their economic rent for themselves.
Because of their government guarantee, Fannie and Freddie were thought to be
well situated when the current credit crisis commenced. As other lenders began to fail
and the secondary market for subprime mortgages dried up in 2007, a Citigroup report
suggested that Fannie and Freddie could easily ride out the turmoil in the mortgage
markets.3 Even more, some commentators were arguing that Fannie and Freddie would
be able to bail out other mortgage market players by buying additional mortgages. At the
same time, however, some were raising the alarm that Fannie and Freddie could face
some of the same problems that other mortgage lenders had been facing. But this view
was overtaken in 2007 by the more dominant one which saw Fannie and Freddie as
saviors of the mortgage markets.
This was a happy development for Fannie and Freddie because it meant that the
terms of the debate regarding their appropriate role in the mortgage markets went from
one in which the Executive Branch was beating the drums to limit their growth to one in
which politicians and mortgage executives were calling for their role to be significantly
expanded. Fannie and Freddie quickly tried to capitalize on this change in their political
fortunes, advocating for an increased role in the crisis. At the earliest stage of the credit
crisis, the Bush Administration continued to oppose an expansion of Fannie and
Freddie‘s roles. As the crisis progressed, the regulator of the two companies began to
3

Hagerty. (2007, July 28).
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signal that they were considering some expansions in Fannie and Freddie‘s role. The
Federal Reserve, which had also been calling for limitations on Fannie and Freddie
before the credit crisis struck, also began to publicly consider a greater role for the two
firms.
B. The Crisis Deepens
As Fannie and Freddie‘s political star began to appear ascendant, troubling
accounts of possible losses started to appear: their underwriting models had been too
optimistic and had not accounted for the possibility of severe reductions in housing prices
across the nation. These fears were confirmed soon thereafter, as Fannie and Freddie
began to report very large losses. These losses meant that Fannie and Freddie did not
have the capital to expand their role in the mortgage markets and that their political star
began its fall once again. The large losses led both companies to seek infusions of fresh
capital. By this point, the federal government was now concerned both with Fannie and
Freddie‘s viability as well as with the health of the overall market. Nonetheless, the
federal government was running out of policy responses to the credit crisis and Fannie
and Freddie were seen as some of the few remaining possible agents that could execute
federal policy.
By the beginning of 2008, the Bush Administration and Congress were seriously
considering various initiatives to create more funding for mortgages, a number of which
were implemented. As part of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, enacted in February
2008, Fannie and Freddie were temporarily allowed to buy or guarantee mortgages with
principal amounts as high as $729,750 in order to restore liquidity to at least a portion of
the jumbo sector. Fannie and Freddie‘s safety and soundness regulator, the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (―OFHEO‖), also lifted Fannie and Freddie‘s
portfolio accounts caps and repeatedly lowered capital requirements in order to help
respond to the housing slump and expand the supply of credit for mortgages.
These steps seemed to have had the intended effect of increasing the supply of
credit available for mortgages. Some commentators, however, were still warning that
Fannie and Freddie continued to be heavily exposed to losses resulting from the housing
7
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slump that they were supposed to be alleviating. The market also began to worry about
Fannie and Freddie‘s solvency, as the yields on their debt widened by 30 basis points to
trade at a historically high 40 basis points above LIBOR in mid-March. By May, more
and more parties were concerned about the solvency of the two companies and Congress
and the Bush Administration were seriously negotiating an overhaul of Fannie and
Freddie‘s safety and soundness regulator, OFHEO, to increase its ability to oversee and
regulate the two companies.
By mid-July, the market‘s serious concerns about Fannie and Freddie‘s viability
were reflected in their stock prices, which were at their lowest levels in more than 16
years. The federal government, on the heels of the Bear Stearns bailout, took decisive
action to prevent another acute crisis in the financial markets. The Treasury Department
announced that it was seeking broad authority from Congress to support Fannie and
Freddie through acquisition of its debt and equity securities. At the same time, the
Federal Reserve announced that it was authorizing emergency lending to the two
companies on the same terms that it has historically lent to its regulated banks and, since
the Bear Stearns bailout, to primary dealers. The Bush Administration kept up the
pressure to move the bailout plan forward, even in the face of Republican hostility in
Congress based on opposition to a taxpayer bailout of the two entities. The bailout plan
was enacted as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. While this
gave confidence that debt-holders would be bailed out in the case of insolvency,
shareholders could not feel the same way, particularly since Fannie and Freddie‘s
massive portfolios were still in trouble. It also did not offer much hope to those who had
hoped that Fannie and Freddie would continue to support the housing market.
C. Congress Responds: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (the ―Act‖) was one of the
major legislative responses to the credit crisis that had begun in 2007. Among other
things, the Act revamped the regulatory oversight for Fannie and Freddie and provided
the Treasury with the authority to bail out Fannie and/or Freddie if they faced insolvency.
Prior to the passage of the Act, Fannie and Freddie‘s financial safety and soundness
8
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regulator was OFHEO, which was an independent agency located within HUD. OFHEO
had limited power over Fannie and Freddie to establish capital standards; conduct
financial examinations; determine capital levels; and appoint conservators.
Two provisions of the Act are most relevant here: (1) one that strengthens Fannie
and Freddie‘s financial safety and soundness regulation and (2) one that temporarily
increases government support for the two companies.
1. Improved Financial Safety and Soundness Regulation
The Act replaces OFHEO with a new independent Federal Housing Finance
Agency (the ―Agency‖). The Agency has general regulatory authority over the two
companies and the Federal Home Loan Banks. The Agency‘s role mirrors that of
OFHEO, but grants it significantly more power to regulate financial safety and soundness
issues. The Agency is intended to be a top notch financial regulator along the lines of
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The Agency is run by a Director appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Director‘s mandate is to ensure that both entities operate with
sufficient capital and internal controls, with a mind towards the public interest, such that
Fannie and Freddie accomplish their purpose of providing liquidity to the mortgage
markets. The Director is assisted in his duties by the Federal Housing Finance Oversight
Board, which advises the Director about strategies and policies. In addition to the
Director, the Board includes the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Act addresses the possible actions to be taken by the Agency should Fannie
and/or Freddie become undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized or critically
undercapitalized. An undercapitalized entity falls under greater monitoring and
restriction of activities. A significantly undercapitalized entity may have its board
replaced and/or executive officers fired. This is also grounds to withhold executive
bonuses. A critically undercapitalized entity may have the Agency named as conservator
or receiver.

9
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2. Temporary Government Support
The Act temporarily authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to make unlimited
equity and debt investments in Fannie and Freddie securities. This appears to be the first
time that the Treasury has been authorized to invest in the equity of privately held
companies. This will only be done by mutual agreement between the relevant GSE and
the Secretary of the Treasury. In order to purchase obligations, an emergency
determination must be made by the Secretary of the Treasury. This determination must
address whether such actions are necessary to provide stability to the financial markets,
prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance and protect the taxpayer.
The Director must consult with, and consider the views of, the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, with respect to the risks posed by the
regulated entities to the financial system, prior to issuing any proposed or final
regulations, orders and guidelines with respect to the exercise of the additional authority
provided in the Act regarding prudential management and operations standards; safe and
sound operations of; and capital requirements and portfolio standards applicable to,
Fannie and Freddie.
In addition to the two provisions discussed above, the Act has two more that are
of some importance to this discussion. These two provisions relate to how the two firms
seek to expand their market share and how they engage in political horse-trading to
achieve their ends, which topics relate to the argument in favor of privatization set forth
in Part III below. The first provision provides funding for affordable housing through an
assessment on Fannie and Freddie. The second provision increases the conforming loan
limits. This increase expanded the companies‘ market and increases the availability of
mortgage credit during the crisis.
The Act requires that Fannie and Freddie ―set aside an amount equal to 4.2 basis
points for each dollar of unpaid principal balance of its total new business purchases.‖4
When the Act was passed, it was generally agreed that this provision would raise
upwards of $500 million each year for affordable housing initiatives.
4

12 U.S.C. §1337.
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The Act also raises the conforming loan limits in some areas. Such limits shall be
increased in areas for which 115 percent of the median house price exceeds the
conforming loan limits, to the lesser of 150 percent of such loan limit or the amount that
is equal to 115 percent of the median house price in such area.
D. Fannie and Freddie Enter Conservatorship
Within days of the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008,
Fannie and Freddie faced demands to raise more capital, pressures that they would not be
able to meet. Within a few weeks, the markets were expecting the federal government to
bail out the two companies. And within a couple of months, Paulson announced that he
was placing the two companies in conservatorship because they were not able to raise the
capital they needed to continue operating. Throughout the credit crisis, their reported
losses have continued to increase.
One important consequence of conservatorship is its impact on the implied
guarantee. Some commentators argue that the implied guarantee is now an explicit one.
The government and the market have not yet embraced this view. How the two
companies exit their conservatorships will help shape the nature of the government
guarantee as well.
As the credit crisis unfolds, there is much speculation as to what form Fannie and
Freddie should take upon exiting conservatorship once the credit crisis has passed. Part
II proposes a theoretical framework to help determine the answer to that question.
II.

Evaluating Fannie and Freddie
There is very little controversy over the overwhelming benefits that Fannie and

Freddie brought to the national mortgage market during the 1970s. Indeed, they, along
with Ginnie Mae, effectively created it. But at least since the early 1990s, there has been
much disagreement with Fannie and Freddie‘s claims that they continue to provide
overwhelming benefits to America‘s homeowners. There has also been an exploration of
the costs that the two companies impose on the American government and on the
mortgage markets. This Part begins by reviewing how Fannie and Freddie claim to
11
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benefit the residential housing finance market and how ―independent scholars‖5 evaluate
their success at reaching these goals. It then draws on theories of regulation and
monopoly to propose a more comprehensive mode of evaluation which untangles their
hybrid public/private structure to demonstrate how that structure gives them
extraordinary benefits that undercut competition in the mortgage markets as well as their
statutorily mandated public missions.
A. Fannie and Freddie‘s Self-Assessment
Fannie and Freddie set forth four standards by which they believe they should be
judged: (a) they lower overall interest rates for homeowners; (b) they offer systemic
stability and liquidity to the market; (c) they increase the supply of affordable housing;
and (d) they have increased consumer protection in the residential market. I will review
evidence for each of these claims in turn. I find that independent research challenges
some of these claimed benefits. Moreover, these four standards are ad hoc and fail to
account for many other impacts that the two companies have on the housing market.
(a) Lower Overall Interest Rates for Homeowners. Fannie and Freddie claim that
they lower interest rates for homeowners. There is nearly universal agreement that this is
true. While Fannie and Freddie describe these lower rates as significant, independent
scholars describe them as modest.
Various studies have measured the benefit to conforming borrowers as being
between 24 and 43 basis points. Assuming an increased 34 point spread (halfway
between the two figures) on a $200,000 mortgage, a borrower would pay an additional
$57 dollars a month in interest. This figure, while significant for the average American
homeowner, is not an extraordinary benefit, particularly for those who can itemize their

5

Fannie and Freddie have funded directly or indirectly most of the research that pertains to them. That
research typically supports Fannie and Freddie‘s own agendas. In addition, many of the scholars writing
about Fannie and Freddie have worked or do work for one of the two companies. Again, much of their
research is supportive of the two companies. I use the terms ―independent scholars‖ and ―independent
research‖ to distinguish scholarly work produced by those without a connection to the two firms as well as
research by Fannie- or Freddie-affiliated researchers that does not appear to have a pro-Fannie and Freddie
bias.
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home mortgage interest deduction to further reduce the after-tax bite of such interest
payments.
Moreover, Michael Froomkin identifies a hidden cost that the Fannie and Freddie
financing model imposes: in many ways the federal government is borrowing at a higher
cost than it needs to if it wants to subsidize residential mortgages.6 Instead of borrowing
through a GSE, the federal government could act directly at a lower cost to assist favored
constituencies like homeowners. For instance, the federal government could directly
provide or guarantee certain kinds of mortgages at a cheaper cost than Fannie and
Freddie, much like it directly provides student loans at a cheaper cost than private
educational lenders. This hidden cost has come into sharper relief during the current
credit crisis, where Fannie and Freddie‘s borrowing costs remained for quite some time
stubbornly high, even after they entered conservatorship. Thus, the Fannie and Freddie
model may not be the most cost-effective means by which the government can achieve
the goal of lower interest rates for homeowners.
(b) Systemic Stability and Liquidity. Congress gave Fannie and Freddie the task
of providing liquidity and stability to the secondary mortgage markets. In 2003, OFHEO
issued a report titled ―Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and The Role of
OFHEO‖ that evaluated their role in the broad financial markets. The report argued that
the systemic implications of Fannie or Freddie‘s financial difficulties would depend on
the circumstances: ―Any systemic disruption would likely be minimal as OFHEO took
prompt corrective action and other market participants filled the short-term market void.
Alternatively, in the unlikely circumstance that an enterprise experienced severe financial
difficulties, they could cause disruptions to the housing market and financial system.‖7
While the secondary mortgage markets generally function well and without
liquidity crises, the credit crunch of 2007-09 has provided a rare opportunity to evaluate
the impact of Fannie and Freddie on liquidity. At early stages in the crisis, Fannie and
Freddie promoted themselves as white knights and lobbied for access to a broader swath
6

Froomkin, at 618.

7

OFHEO. (2003).
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of the mortgage market in order to stabilize them. But as the credit crisis developed, it
became clear that Fannie and Freddie were subject to the same forces that had led to the
insolvency and massive write-downs of private mortgage lenders, until the government
stepped in quite forcefully to bolster the government-supported mortgage market.
In early 2008, the federal government authorized Fannie and Freddie to purchase
loans with significantly higher principal amounts in high-cost areas like New York and
California, again in order to provide additional liquidity. But at around the same time,
Fannie and Freddie revealed that they faced billions of dollars in losses caused by their
poor underwriting. Fannie Mae issued additional shares to raise billions of dollars of
capital to ensure that they complied with the OFHEO capitalization requirements and
Freddie Mac planned to do the same. But, as noted above, Fannie and Freddie ultimately
required a bailout in order to prevent a crisis that would have spread far beyond the
American residential mortgage market to infect the entire global credit market, if left
unchecked. The net effect is that Fannie and Freddie did provide some temporary
liquidity and stability but their long term impact was very harmful to the broad financial
system and will likely cost the American taxpayer many tens of billions of dollars to
resolve the harm they ultimately caused.
(c) Affordable Housing Goals. The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety
and Soundness Act of 1992 established three affordable housing goals for Fannie and
Freddie, those for (1) low- and moderate-income housing; (2) special affordable housing;
and (3) central cities, rural areas, and other underserved areas housing. Pursuant to this
statute, HUD is responsible for monitoring, adjusting and enforcing these housing goals.
These goals represent what should be the percentage of housing units financed by Fannie
and Freddie each year.
Fannie and Freddie typically meet these goals, although they sometimes may use
financing shenanigans (such as buying a portfolio of loans solely to meet affordable
housing goals) to do so. Independent research, however, has challenged whether these
goals actually increase the net amount of affordable housing. A number of studies have
indicated that Fannie and Freddie actually cannibalize the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) loan market by lending to borrowers who would have otherwise
14
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Creatures of Regulatory Privilege 2/3/2010

David Reiss

received FHA mortgages. The U.S. General Accounting Office has also questioned
whether Fannie and Freddie, notwithstanding their particular affordable housing mandate,
do any more than any other lenders to promote affordable housing.
(d) Consumer Protection. Fannie and Freddie argue that they have helped to
standardize the conforming mortgage to the benefit of consumers. Many, including this
author, have praised this standardization as a positive, something that on the whole
reduces bad options for consumers. This generally positive development is not without
some costs to consumers, however, as it reduces the financing choices available to them.
For instance, Fannie and Freddie have effectively banished prepayment penalties from
the prime conforming mortgage market, which sounds like a good thing for consumers.
But some consumers might have preferred to take a loan with a prepayment penalty if it
meant that the loan would have had a lower interest rate.
Moreover, recent news about Freddie‘s role in the subprime and Alt-A markets
undercut Fannie and Freddie‘s consumer protection argument to some extent.
Apparently, the two firms had a much greater exposure to the disastrous Alt-A (also
known as the ―liar loan‖) subsector than they had previously let on. In Congressional
testimony in late 2008, Fannie‘s former chief credit officer reported that the two
companies ―now guarantee or hold 10.5 million nonprime loans worth $1.6 trillion -- one
in three of all subprime loans, and nearly two in three of all so-called Alt-A loans, often
called ‗liar loans.‘‖8 As these two sectors were rife with predatory lending practices,
Fannie and Freddie may be seen as complicit with these practices even though they did
not engage in them directly.
B. Existing Theories of the Government-Sponsored Enterprise
Alice Rivlin, as then-director of the Office of Management and Budget, has stated
that ―GSEs were created because wholly private financial institutions were believed to be
incapable of providing an adequate supply of loanable funds at all times and to all regions

8

Browning.
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of the nation for specified types of borrowers.‖9 This is certainly the primary reason that
Congress employs GSEs, even if, as Thomas Stanton notes, ―market imperfections are
much more difficult to find today‖ than they were when Fannie and Freddie were
created.10
Michael Froomkin has suggested four additional reasons behind Congress‘
decision to create federal government corporations like Fannie and Freddie: (a) they are
believed to be more efficient at achieving market-related goals; (b) they are believed to
be more insulated from politics than a division of a large federal agency; (c) they are
believed to be effective at delivering targeted subsidies; and (d) they are a useful
subterfuge for Congress because their borrowing is typically not counted as part of the
federal deficit.11 As seen in this chapter, there is good reason to doubt that the first three
reasons are as compelling as Congress would have liked. There is also good reason to
believe that Congress was spot on regarding the fourth. Rivlin and Froomkin outline the
major reasons that Congress creates GSEs, but they do not offer a comprehensive theory
of the GSE. Existing efforts to do that are reviewed below.
Finance and economics scholars have proposed a variety of cost/benefit
frameworks with which to evaluate Fannie and Freddie, although this is no mean task.
These frameworks have often relied upon various ad hoc metrics, such as whether Fannie
and Freddie actually lower interest rates for homeowners or how much of the
Fannie/Freddie subsidy is passed on to homebuyers. There is general agreement that the
two companies do lower interest rates to some extent and that they do so by passing on a
portion of the subsidy that derives from the government‘s guarantee of their obligations
on to homeowners.
Fannie and Freddie, of course, argue that they still provide an array of benefits,
while others vigorously dispute this claim. Fannie and Freddie know that this debate is
fundamentally one about their right to exist as GSEs. Their critics, on the other hand,
9

OMB.

10

Stanton, at 10.

11

Froomkin, 557-559.

16
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Creatures of Regulatory Privilege 2/3/2010

David Reiss

have become increasingly strident in their criticism of the Fannie and Freddie business
model as these companies have grown way beyond the expectations of anyone who had
studied them in the 1970s and 1980s.
While this body of literature has provided many insights into Fannie and Freddie,
it does not provide an overarching theoretical framework that would help determine their
value. Such a framework should describe the ecology of Fannie and Freddie as well as
the incentives and structural limitations that drive the development of the two companies.
It should also provide guidance as to how they should be treated going forward.
C. Fannie and Freddie Evaluated through the Lens of Regulatory Theory
Given Fannie and Freddie‘s monstrous size and market power, there are no
comparable public-private hybrid entities. As products of regulation, however, they fit
well within existing theories of regulation. This section evaluates their value as agents of
public policy through the lens of regulatory theory.
Two oft-stated objectives of government economic policy are to maintain and
encourage competition between firms in order to increase ―the material welfare of
society‖12 as well as to maximize consumer welfare ―through lower prices, better quality
and greater choice.‖13 Cass Sunstein has rightfully noted that many regulatory regimes
therefore reflect ―a belief that regulatory enactments might simultaneously promote
economic productivity and help the disadvantaged.‖14 But Sunstein has also noted, along
with many others, that one of the main criticisms of regulation is that it is ―only
purportedly in the public interest‖ and that it ―turns out on inspection to be interest-group
transfers designed to protect well-organized private groups . . . at the expense of the rest
of the citizenry.‖15
12
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Indeed, modern theories of regulation stem from the insight that firms attempt to
use regulation as a device ―to establish or to enhance monopoly power.‖16 Assessing the
role of regulation in a particular market is necessary to understand whether that market is
functioning competitively and equitably. Fannie and Freddie, although born of regulation
themselves, claim to act competitively. Theories of regulation thus provide a useful
framework with which to understand the market in which Fannie and Freddie operate,
one that allows us to evaluate whether the companies increase ―the material welfare of
society‖ and maximize consumer welfare. This Part will analyze Fannie and Freddie as
creatures of regulatory privilege within the context of regulatory theory.
The core of Fannie and Freddie‘s regulatory privilege is the government‘s
guarantee of their obligations, which was initially granted to create a national secondary
residential mortgage market. This implied guarantee drives any competition from the
conforming mortgage market because the two companies can borrow money so much
more cheaply than their competitors. This lower cost of funds means that that they can
out-compete fully-private financial institutions in the conforming market, thereby
keeping the conforming sector to themselves.
The government guarantee is a variant on the longstanding government practice
of spurring private investment in various arenas by granting some privilege or monopoly
power to a party that will infuse the activity with needed capital or bring focused
attention to it. For example, government-granted monopolies can take the form of a
charter granting a monopoly on trade, such as the one granted by Queen Elizabeth I to the
English East India Company in 1600 in order to increase English trade with Asian
nations. They can take the form of a system such as that governing American patents,
granting patent-holders the sole right to exploit a patent for a certain period in order to
encourage innovation. Or they can take the form of a regulated natural monopoly, like a
utility company, that is regulated not only to protect consumers from monopoly pricing
but also to ensure that the company can make a fair return on its investment.

16
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Unlike true monopolists, Fannie and Freddie are limited by the nature of their
competitive advantage: in an otherwise efficient market, the maximum amount that they
can retain as economic rent is the spread between the interest rates they must pay and
those that their competitors must pay. Notwithstanding this cap on profits, Fannie and
Freddie share an important characteristic with government-granted monopolies: a
legally-created and overwhelming competitive funding advantage in a particular market
that derives from their special charters. This advantage translates into higher prices for
consumers than would exist if Fannie and Freddie did not retain a portion of their
economic rent for shareholders and management.
Regulatory theory identifies six goals that are relevant to a study of Fannie and
Freddie, including (i) maintaining competition; (ii) efficiently allocating society‘s goods
and services; (iii) promoting innovation; (iv) preventing inappropriate wealth transfers;
(v) preserving consumer choice; and (vi) preventing an overly-concentrated economy.
The first three goals related to economic efficiency concerns. The second three goals
address additional public policy objectives. As shall be seen below, Fannie and Freddie
do little to effectuate these goals. Indeed, in some cases they act contrary to them.
(i) Maintaining Competition. Maintaining competition is one of the most
important goals of economic regulation. But applying this goal to Fannie and Freddie‘s
activities is a bit difficult as there was no real national mortgage market when they were
created. Indeed, they were formed in order create a new product: a fungible mortgage
product. So, to begin with, there was barely any competition with which Fannie and
Freddie could interfere. And now, because of their funding advantage, they have no
competitors in the prime conforming market. This state of affairs presents two questions
regarding competition in the modern residential mortgage market: should there be more
competition in the conforming mortgage market; and should Fannie and Freddie be
allowed to expand the markets in which they compete while maintaining their funding
advantage?
As to the first question, it is non-controversial to answer that competition is
considered healthy in almost all markets, except for those that are better suited to natural
monopolies like the utilities market. While Fannie and Freddie maintain that they
19
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Creatures of Regulatory Privilege 2/3/2010

David Reiss

compete with each other, independent commentators describe their behavior more as that
of duopolists than competitors. As to the second question, it again is non-controversial to
state that introducing subsidized firms like Fannie and Freddie into a generally efficient
non-subsidized mortgage market like the jumbo market would distort pricing in that
market.
And Fannie and Freddie are entering that jumbo market: the rapidly increasing
size of the conforming loan limit, a product of furious lobbying by the two firms, allows
Fannie and Freddie to claim more of the overall mortgage market for themselves as
opposed to their jumbo-originating competitors. As Fannie and Freddie both operate
without competition in the conforming market and expand their markets through political
action, they seem to operate contrary to the goal of maintaining competition.
Moreover, if one believes that Fannie and Freddie were primarily created to
develop the national mortgage market, then it follows that their government-granted
privilege should be revoked after they have completed that task. That is, Fannie and
Freddie‘s regulatory privilege should be treated more like the privilege granted to patents,
which only allows for a temporary monopoly for the express purpose of encouraging
innovation, rather than a natural monopoly like that of a utility company that is typically
regulated in perpetuity because they have no potential competition.
(ii) Efficiently Allocating Society’s Goods and Services. In a productively
efficient system, each unit of a product is produced at the lowest possible cost. If a
producer in a competitive market fails to produce its product at the lowest possible cost, it
would likely fail. This result would not typically apply to a monopolist because it does
not face competition in its market. Monopolists thus typically lack ―sufficient incentive
to hold production costs at low levels.‖17
The competitive advantage provided by Fannie and Freddie‘s regulatory privilege
is limited, as discussed above, by the fact that they would face competition if the price
(interest rate and fees) in the conforming market was equal to or higher than the price in
the jumbo market. But so long as they keep the price lower than the price in the jumbo
17
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market, they are able to extract some economic rent. Thus, they are not efficiently
allocating society‘s goods and services.
Regulatory privilege imposes certain additional social costs. Its beneficiaries
incur costs to retain and expand it, often through campaign contributions, lobbying and
bribery. Such firms are also more likely to dissipate their rents through expenditures like
advertising in order to protect their privileged status. Fannie and Freddie are thus best
understood as rent-seekers who expend resources to obtain favorable regulation in order
to obtain rents.
(iii) Promoting Innovation. Recipients of regulatory privilege may have less
impetus to innovate because of their competitive advantage. Fannie and Freddie claim,
however, that they continue to innovate as the secondary market matures. Indeed, they
have executed a number of innovations that allow them to profit from aspects of the
mortgage market that had traditionally fallen outside of the scope of their activities.
These include, for instance, the development of automated underwriting systems and
underwriting guidance systems for third parties. It is no coincidence that these
innovations allow the two companies to enter new markets, thereby pushing against the
limitations on their expansion into new markets contained in their charters. The
Mortgage Banking Association argues that in the area of underwriting technology, Fannie
and Freddie have actually squelched the innovations of others, much as Microsoft has
squelched its competitors by tying new products to its operating software.
Private label competitors have innovated at a far greater rate than Fannie and
Freddie, introducing a dizzying array of products for consumers to choose from and
securities for investors to choose from although much of that innovation now seems
foolish, greedy and wrongheaded. At a minimum, there is no evidence that Fannie and
Freddie innovate more than they would if they faced a marketplace filled with many
competitors. That being said, as the subprime crisis unfolds, the once vaunted innovation
of private-label lenders has taken on a decidedly morbid pall. Kathleen Engel and
Patricia McCoy argue quite convincingly how the business model of these private-label
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lenders led directly to much of the abusive lending of the last ten years.18 One might
argue that this goal of regulatory theory should weigh in favor of Fannie and Freddie if
they themselves did not invest so heavily in subprime and Alt A mortgages originated by
the very same private label lenders that engaged in such dangerous innovations.
(iv) Preventing Inappropriate Wealth Transfers. Monopolists are willing to
forgo sales for increased profits. Similarly, Fannie and Freddie forgo offering the lowest
possible price for mortgages; they do this by retaining a portion of their subsidy, instead
of passing it on the borrowers as they would in a perfectly competitive market. This is
reflected in the outsized profits that Fannie and Freddie have historically enjoyed as
compared to other financial institutions. It may also be reflected in the generous pay
packages that management awards itself before turning over the remainder of the
economic rent to shareholders. Furthermore, just as monopoly pricing dissuades some
buyers who would have purchased a good at a competitive price from doing so at the
monopoly price, which is allocatively inefficient, Fannie and Freddie‘s retention of a
portion of their subsidy keeps some potential borrowers from borrowing.
(v) Preserving Consumer Choice. Government regulates businesses that operate
in markets that are not fully competitive, in part, to achieve fairness for consumers.
Because of their competitive advantage in the conforming loan market, consumers
effectively only have the choice of Fannie or Freddie. As noted above, Fannie and
Freddie argue convincingly that they have helped to standardize the prime, conforming
mortgage to the benefit of consumers.
There is no question that private label firms would enter the conforming market if
they were able to borrow funds at rates comparable to those that Freddie and Fannie can
borrow at. The pros and cons of those private-label firms have been well documented in
the jumbo and subprime markets: they expand consumer choice but often at the expense
of the consumer protection inherent in a simple and standardized market place. More
competitors would, of course, mean more consumer choice of lenders. It would also
likely mean more choice of mortgage products. But in the context of mortgage lending,
18
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more consumer choice is a two-edged sword, as the implosion of the subprime market
attests.
Fannie and Freddie also argue that they implement the government‘s policy of
increasing homeownership; indeed, Fannie‘s slogan is ―Our Business is the American
Dream.‖ They claim that they have thereby helped the nation achieve a great increase in
the rate of homeownership. This claim is undercut in a variety of ways. First, the credit
crunch has made some question whether homeownership is a good in and of itself for all
households. Second, some scholars argue that America over-invests in housing and that
Fannie and Freddie are part of that problem. Third, it is unclear whether they actually
help to fund affordable housing for low- and moderate-income homeowners, who should
presumably be the main beneficiaries of such a government initiative. Fourth, the
amount that the typical homeowner saves because of Fannie and Freddie is relatively
modest.
(vi) Preventing an Overly-Concentrated Economy. Regulation may be employed
to reduce over-concentrations of market power. Fannie and Freddie argue, however, that
their vast size provides stability to the mortgage market; independent scholars disagree.
Recent events further disfavor the Fannie/Freddie perspective. Each of Fannie and
Freddie present an over-concentration of risk that is perhaps unsurpassed by any other
private firm operating anywhere in the world. Because the two companies have the
identical, undiversified business model, that risk is only magnified. Thus, any substantial
operational risk or mistaken hedging strategy at either of those firms, poses a systemic
risk to the international economy, a risk that has already become a reality.
*

*

*

Fannie and Freddie do not do well when these six regulatory goals are taken
together. As to the three economic efficiency goals, the conforming market is not as
competitive or efficient as it would be if there were more competitors. There is also no
evidence that the market is more innovative than it would be if there were more
competitors. Thus, merely on economic efficiency grounds, Fannie and Freddie‘s
regulatory privilege does not serve the public interest. Nor do Fannie and Freddie do
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particularly well with the other public policy goals. The two companies engage in rentseeking; limit consumer choice; and keep other firms from competing with them.
The two areas where Fannie and Freddie seem to offer some clear and significant
benefits are (i) providing short term liquidity and stability to the mortgage market during
an acute crisis and (ii) promoting consumer protection, at least in the prime, conforming
sector. This second point is underscored by the events leading up to the credit crisis
which have demonstrated that too much consumer choice in the mortgage arena can lead
to horrible results. If the benefits offered by Fannie and Freddie could be undertaken
through alternate means, one might conclude that Fannie and Freddie are not particularly
beneficial agents of public policy.
In sum, regulatory theory helps to untangle Fannie and Freddie‘s intended market
function from their intended public mission and to explain how the two purposes do not
work well individually or taken together. Because Fannie and Freddie are creatures of
federal regulatory privilege, and not independent firms that are operating in a relatively
unregulated market, the federal government has broad latitude in setting new goals for
these two firms and modifying the regulatory privileges awarded to them.
III.

Fannie and Freddie’s GSE Status Should Be Terminated
Identifying the weaknesses of Fannie and Freddie as agents of public policy is

very different from identifying what should be done with them. The two companies have
two of the most powerful lobbying machines in Washington. Moreover, the nature of
Fannie and Freddie‘s privileges makes it unlikely that they will be revisited by Congress
with any regularity. Because Fannie and Freddie are poor agents of public policy and are
political powerhouses with unmatched influence, the two companies should be fully
privatized.
A. Fannie and Freddie Are Political Powerhouses
Jonathan Koppell has thoroughly documented how Fannie and Freddie have been
able to exercise unparalleled influence in Washington.19 Mirroring the hybrid analysis in
19
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this chapter, he concludes that it is the combining of elements of public instrumentalities
and private companies that is what gives them the ―best of both worlds‖ – in terms of the
political influence the two companies can marshal. Thus, any policy proposals relating to
the two companies must be evaluated in the context of the political environment in which
they operate.
Given that Fannie and Freddie have outsized influence in Washington, one must
be cautious in recommending half-measures in reaction to their limitations as agents of
public policy. Unfortunately, most of the reforms floated in the last few years would
seem to fall within this category. They include
limiting the size of their mortgage portfolios;
limiting their debt issuance;
stripping the two companies of some of their unique privileges to
signal to the market that the implied guarantee has been weakened;
freezing the conforming loan value to limit the size of mortgages
they can buy, thereby limiting their overall size;
requiring them to obtain ratings from rating agencies for their debt
issuances that discount the implied guarantee;
imposing user fees; and
strengthening their subordinated debt programs.
If any of these half-measures were adopted, however, Fannie and Freddie‘s lobbying
juggernaut would be sure to undercut them as soon as Congress‘ focus moved on to
another pressing issue.
B. The Government Guarantee Is a Reckless Budgeting Device
Michael Froomkin, among others, has identified the encouragement of federal
budget shenanigans as a hard to quantify ―cost‖ of the Fannie and Freddie hybrid
business model.20 This is because the federal government‘s contingent liability for its
guarantee of Fannie and Freddie‘s obligations is off-budget, allowing Congress to avoid
having that liability trigger debt ceiling limits. If off-budget accounting is a bad sign
when found in corporations such as Enron, it is at least as bad for the federal government.
For, while the federal government was ultimately able to investigate Enron, who will
20
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watch the watchers? Indeed, if the federal government had to quantify and account for
this contingent liability in its budget, it would most certainly reduce Congress‘ ability to
increase net spending.
Fannie and Freddie thus pose four serious budgetary problems. First, the cost of
the government‘s guarantee is hidden because it is historically treated as off-budget.
Second, the cost of the guarantee is particularly difficult to quantify. Third, the cost of
the guarantee is not capped by the federal government, given that the federal government
has not imposed any meaningful limits on Fannie and Freddie‘s growth. Finally, Fannie
and Freddie‘s charters and the costs they might pose to the federal government are
infrequently revisited by Congress. Indeed, Congress only takes a serious look at them
every ten years or so.
Cheryl Block, in her work on the federal tax budget, proposes a set of principles
that should guide the budget legislative process. These principles are built on those relied
upon by the General Accounting Office and are 1) budget formation as a democratic
exercise; 2) enforceability; 3) accountability; 4) transparency; and 5) openness and
durability.21 These five principles help to clarify the manner in which the contingent
liability of the government‘s guarantee should be treated in the federal budget process.
The government‘s guarantee of Fannie and Freddie‘s obligations, when viewed as
an item in the legislative budgetary process, fails to abide by any of these principles.
Because the government guarantee of Fannie and Freddie‘s obligations was effectively
created decades ago, it is generally not part of the annual debate surrounding the budget.
Because the size of the guarantee is uncapped and contingent, it fails the enforceability
and accountability principles: it operates outside of the budget, its cost is hard to estimate
and the trigger for the federal government‘s obligation to make good on it is in itself an
unexpected event. Similarly, the guarantee, because of its contingent nature, is quite
confusing to those outside of the budget process. Finally, it fails to meet the openness
and durability principles because it is not typically part of the annual budget
deliberations.
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In sum, the budgetary implications of the government‘s guarantee provide an
additional public policy argument against Fannie and Freddie‘s hybrid structure, one that
even on its own weighs heavily against them as agents of public policy.
C. Fannie and Freddie Should Be Privatized
There are four broad positions regarding the appropriate role of Fannie and
Freddie in the housing finance market. First, Fannie and Freddie are generally doing the
job that they were designed to do, although their powers and that of their regulators
should be tweaked. Second, Fannie and Freddie are generally doing their job, but they
are retaining too much of the value of the government guarantee for the benefit of
shareholders and management at the expense of their affordable housing goals. Third,
Fannie and Freddie should be nationalized because the federal government has taken on
most of the risk associated with them already. And finally, Fannie and Freddie pose a
systemic risk to the financial system, unfairly benefit from their regulatory privilege and
do not create net benefits for the American people.
This chapter has taken the fourth position. In particular, it argues that the
government guarantee should be terminated and the two companies should be privatized.
Until they entered conservatorship, this position has been considered a political
nonstarter, particularly because Fannie and Freddie have many allies in the Republican
and Democratic parties. Due to recent events, it is now one of the options on the table for
a post-conservatorship Fannie and Freddie.
One taking the first view—that Fannie and Freddie are generally doing the job
that they were designed to do—might argue that ―[t]he penetration of competitive
markets by laws and regulations is a highly durable and robust intrusion in the U.S.
economy . . . [which] is arguable as tightly regulated as the more socialistic economics of
Western Europe.‖22 Thus, there is no need to extricate the federal government from its
relationship with Fannie and Freddie because the government has similar relationships
with many other private companies. Proponents of this view typically recommend the
limited reforms outlined in Part III.A above.
22

Crew & Rowley. (1988).

27
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Creatures of Regulatory Privilege 2/3/2010

David Reiss

Affordable housing providers and advocates often take the second position:
Fannie and Freddie are pretty much doing their job of making housing more affordable to
Americans, but they are retaining too much of the value of the government guarantee for
the benefit of the shareholders and management, at the expense of their affordable
housing goals. Given the shared agenda of Fannie and Freddie on the one hand and
affordable housing providers and advocates on the other, this position should not come as
a surprise to a student of regulation. Thus, these parties favor proposals that redirect
some of the excess profits of Fannie and Freddie from their shareholders and
management to affordable housing programs.
And, indeed, in a plan subsequently suspended by federal conservatorship,
Congress had implemented an affordable housing fund in which the two firms would
deposit upwards of $500 million of their income each year. These monies were to be
invested in affordable housing projects throughout the country. Affordable housing
advocates saw this as a painless way to dramatically increase the supply of affordable
housing. The ongoing bailout of the two companies demonstrates that the initiative was
not painless, just pain deferred.
Fannie and Freddie supported this proposal in exchange for expanding their
market. This expansion was implemented by increasing the conforming loan limit in
high-cost parts of the country, which allowed the two companies to expand into the
bottom part of the jumbo market. It is of note, of course, that Fannie and Freddie‘s
support for such an extraordinarily costly initiative as the affordable housing fund came
at a low point of their public prestige and was widely seen as a political compromise that
brought together a broad set of special interests whose goals are aligned with those of
Fannie and Freddie. These interests included affordable housing advocates, local
governments and the construction industry.
The dynamics of this position are complex. Housing advocates are concerned
with the sustained lack of attention that federal and state governments have paid to
affordable housing policy and see any dedicated housing dollars as a long overdue
priority. Implicit in this view is that the risk of a Fannie and/or Freddie bailout to the
typical American taxpayer is worth the benefit of the affordable housing dollars that the
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affordable housing fund could direct to low- and moderate-income families. The real
debate, from this perspective, is how much of the golden egg of the economic rents
resulting from the implied subsidy (as revealed by Fannie and Freddie‘s profits that
consistently and greatly exceed their industry average) can be redirected to these
affordable housing objectives without killing the Fannie and Freddie geese.
The third position, nationalization, had only begun to be taken seriously as the
Fannie and Freddie bailouts become more and more likely. Indeed, then-Secretary
Paulson has raised the idea, one which would seem to be anathema to a fiscal
conservative like himself. Paulson proposed merging the two companies with the Federal
Housing Administration, a government agency, which already insures certain mortgages.
He did note, however, that such a plan would place much of the underwriting in the hands
of the government, which is unlikely to do that task well (not the private sector has done
so either in recent years!).
As noted above, this chapter advocates for the fourth view: Fannie and Freddie
pose a systemic risk to the financial system, unfairly benefit from their regulatory
privilege and no longer create meaningful net benefits for the American people. In
speaking of regulatory reform, Sunstein notes that a good first step ―would be to adopt a
presumption in favor of flexible, market-oriented, incentive-based, and decentralized
regulatory strategies. Such strategies should be focused on ends . . . rather than on the
means of achieving those ends.‖23 Fannie and Freddie are holdovers from an earlier
philosophy of government action, one that has seen its day come and go. Indeed, if one
were to create from scratch a new system of federally-supported residential mortgage
finance, it is quite clear that the model would not be Fannie and Freddie, which are
relatively inflexible and centralized solutions to the complex and fluid problems posed by
the housing finance market. And while there is an argument to be made that Fannie and
Freddie are market-oriented and incentive-based, it is a stronger argument to say that they
are beneficiaries of regulatory privilege with incentives that have benefited their
management disproportionately.
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Privatization is needed to remedy this state of affairs. Notwithstanding Fannie
and Freddie‘s potency in Washington, this is not merely some fanciful policy proposal.
Theories of regulation and rent-seeking identify erosions of government-granted
monopolies over time as part of their natural lifecycle. And, as the credit crisis continues
to worsen, more and more previously unthinkable solutions are being taken quite
seriously.
Four concrete plans have been proposed to fundamentally change Fannie and
Freddie‘s structure, each involving different degrees of government involvement. First,
convert them into cooperatives owned by lenders. Second, break the companies up into a
number of smaller companies (or charter a number of similar competitors). Third, leave
them intact, but regulate them like public utilities. Fourth, convert them into generic
financial holding companies.
The first proposal, converting Fannie and Freddie into cooperatives, has
precedent. There are two other privately-owned GSEs that are cooperative lenders: the
Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLB System) and the Farm Credit System. Some
commentators have called for the FHLB System to take over Fannie and Freddie. This
proposal has some initial attraction as it might attenuate the short term profit-maximizing
culture that characterizes publicly-traded corporations like Fannie and Freddie. But
history does not give comfort that such a GSE structure is superior to that of Fannie and
Freddie‘s. Indeed, Congress had to bail out the Farm Credit System in 1987. And there
are rumblings that the FHLB System may face problems similar to those of Fannie and
Freddie.
The second proposal, chartering additional housing finance competitors, has some
initial attraction. Indeed, one might consider the federal deposit insurance system to be a
model of this: numerous recipients of regulatory privilege (access to federally guarantee
insurance) who must compete amongst themselves. If the Fannie/Freddie duopoly could
be diluted with enough similar competitors, the amount of economic rent that Fannie and
Freddie retain from their government guarantee subsidy should reduce significantly. In
addition, one might think that a more competitive market would spread risk among more
firms.
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Upon further reflection, however, this proposal also reveals significant flaws. The
benefit of GSE competition is less compelling now that we have experienced a bubble
where so many financial institutions demonstrated herd-like behavior in their business
models. And, as with the first proposal, the American taxpayer is still left with the
contingent liability of the government guarantee.
The third proposal, regulating them like utilities, appears to be favored by Paulson
and taken seriously by the likes of former Federal Housing Finance Agency Director
Lockhart. One worries however, how the common regulatory problem of capture would
be avoided here where the two companies to be regulated are so clearly skilled in the art
of politics.
The fourth proposal, converting them into generic financial services holding
companies along the lines of institutions like Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and Bank of
America, has the attraction of simplicity. It also terminates the contingent liability of the
government guarantee and allows the conforming mortgage market to function like other
sectors of the overall mortgage market. There is also a precedent for this approach:
Sallie Mae was successfully converted from a GSE to a private company. This approach
would also send the message that the American mortgage markets have grown up and are
now to be integrated with the rest of the financial sector.
This proposal has its own limitations which must be addressed if it were to be
implemented. First, because Fannie and Freddie can offer at least a short term stabilizing
role in the residential mortgage markets, the federal government would need to
implement other policies to take on that role. Possible policy responses to market
disruptions could include providing targeted federal mortgage guarantees; authorizing the
Treasury to make mortgage-backed securities purchases; and allowing mortgage lenders
to access the Federal Reserve‘s discount window. Policies like these can ensure that the
residential mortgage market function during a panic.
Second, homeowners will pay slightly higher interest for conforming mortgages if
the two companies were privatized. If Congress determines that this increase were too
much, particularly given the current condition of the economy, it could reduce the burden
by modifying the deduction for mortgage interest or by providing a tax credit relating to
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mortgage interest. While such a strategy will decrease federal revenues it will be offset
by the liability that Fannie and Freddie impose on the federal government, a liability that
is already on its way to costing taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars as part of the
current bailout.
Third, if the federal government wanted to increase funding for affordable
housing as contemplated in the Act, it would need to do so through direct expenditures.
Again, this direct cost would be offset by terminating the contingent liability of the
government guarantee.
Finally, Fannie and Freddie have imposed pro-consumer terms on the prime
conforming mortgage market. These must be maintained and built upon through new
consumer protection regulation in order to avoid the nasty and brutish environment of the
subprime mortgage market. And, indeed, it is hard to imagine that privatization would be
politically feasible if such protections were not built into the privatization proposal.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the full-privatization proposal has the most
going for it. It avoids the problem of the government guarantee that remains with the
other three proposals. It leaves to the private sector what the private sector is supposed to
do best: evaluate risk. And it leaves to the government what it is supposed to do best:
protect against systemic risk, protect consumers; and provide affordable housing to those
who could not otherwise afford it.
IV.

Conclusion
The main problem with GSEs is well-documented: they take on a life of their

own and can survive well after they have achieved the purposes for which they are
created. Alice Rivlin, in her then-capacity as the director of the Office of Management
and Budget, stated that ―GSEs should only be created with a clearly articulated ‗exit
strategy‘ and an express sunset date in their charter.‖24 Unfortunately, this is almost
never the case.

24

OMB.
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The typical result of poor GSE design is that the GSE ends up driving much of the
legislative and regulatory agenda regarding their own fates. Stanton and Moe argue that
this can lead to ―increasing dominance over the governmental process‖ by GSEs; the
inability ―of the government to supervise GSE safety and soundness and the
government‘s resulting financial exposure;‖ as well as government inability ―to induce
GSEs to serve public purposes that conflict with the interests of shareholders.‖25
Fannie and Freddie reflect what is worst in GSE design. After fulfilling their
purpose of creating a national mortgage market, they have taken on monstrously large
lives of their own. In the midst of their bailout, Congress should take the opportunity to
convert them to fully private status. Congress should also enact appropriate financial
regulation, consumer protection legislation and affordable housing programs. And
Congress should remember the lessons of Fannie and Freddie when it considers using the
GSE as a tool of government in the future. It should reflect on the appropriate design for
such a hybrid tool, a design informed by a theoretical understanding of the GSE based on
regulatory theory and sound federal budget policies.
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